Programme Evaluation of Unemployment Benefits in Japan : An Average Treatment Effect Approach by Ohkusa, Yasushi
Discussion Paper No. 570 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PROGRAMME EVALUATION OF  
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS IN JAPAN: 
AN AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT APPROACH 
 
 
Yasushi Ohkusa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January 2003 
 
 
The Institute of Social and Economic Research 
Osaka University 
6-1 Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, Japan 
(forthcoming in Japan and the World Economy)
Programme Evaluation of Unemployment Benefits
in Japan
An Average Treatment Effect Approach∗)
Yasushi Ohkusa
Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Abstract
Empirical results show that unemployment benefits (UB) recipients significantly change
to worse job conditions with respect to wages and firm size, but change to better job
conditions with respect to occupation, position, industry, and residence. While the effects
for occupation are not significant, UB recipients have a significant tendency to stay the
same. In other words, results of other conditions imply that they reduce the reservation
wage to get better conditions with respect to occupation, industry and residence. This
means strong inertia in these aspects.
JEL Classifications: J63, J64, J65
Keywords: Unemployment Benefits, Duration of Unemployment, Search Effort, Working
Conditions, Nonparametric Propensity Score Matching Method, Average Treatment Effect
Correspondence:Yasushi Ohkusa, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka Uni-
versity, 6-1 Mihogaoka Ibaraki Osaka, Japan
Tel:81-6-6879-8566 Fax:81-6-6878-2766
e-mail:ohkusa@iser.osaka-u.ac.jp
1 Introduction
The unemployment rate in Japan has been rising rapidly since the 1990s and it is more
than 5% after 2000. The official Labour White Paper of the Japanese Ministry of Labour
in 1999 indicated that the structural and frictional unemployment rate was more than 3%,
and that economic policy to counter recession could not solve this high unemployment
problem, at least in the short term. Except in 1998 and 1999 when the Netherlands and
the USA respectively achieved lower unemployment rates, Japan has enjoyed the lowest
unemployment rate among OECD countries. In the recent period of high unemployment in
Japan, the scarecity of the Employment Insurance System1) have been remarkable, as this
was based on the previous long-term low unemployment rate. This paper focuses on the
unemployment benefits (UB) among several aspects of the Employment Insurance System,
and examines its effects on the search behaviour of the unemployed2).
Many investigations evaluate the UB effect on the behaviour of the unemployed. The
elasticities of UB levels with respect to unemployment duration have been estimated to be
about 0.28-0.36 in the UK (Narendrannathan, Nickell and Stern (1985)) and about 0.36 in
the USA. While simple international comparisons can be misleading because of different
UB systems and backgrounds3), these imply that the unemployment period is extended
by half a week if the UB level increases by 10% (Moffitt (1985))4). On the other hand,
the effect of potential UB duration on unemployment duration is larger. Katz and Meyer
(1990) predicts that this elasticity is twice as large as that of the UB level. Christofields and
McKenna (1995) also finds that the hiring rate significantly increases in the last month of
the UB period in Canada. Similar patterns are confirmed in Japan (Tachibanaki (1984)).
Moreover, Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) finds that the replacement rate effect on wage
gains is limited: It is significant for females but not for males. Overall, these studies
indicate some evidence of moral hazard in the UB recipient’s behaviour.
However, even if the UB extends the duration of unemployment, it may not directry
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imply the precense of the moral hazard. As the UB loosens the budget constraint of its
recipients unambiguously, it should extend the duration of unemployment. The problem is
whether the recipients decrease their intensity of search behaviour rather than increasing
in their duration of unemployment. Even with the extended unemployed duration, if they
do not lower the intensity of their search behaviour, they will receive good conditions in
their new jobs and this longer unemployed duration should not be judged to be as a moral
hazard. Therefore, programme evaluation for UB should be measured by the conditions
of the new jobs in comparison with those of previous jobs rather than by examining the
duration of unemployment or the unemployment rate.
To investigate this argument, the author attempts to incorporate conditions in the new
job with exogenous UB receipt in Ohkusa (2000a) and with endogenous UB receipt in
Ohkusa (2000b). This paper analyze this problem as a program evaluation to UB as in
Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997, 1998). Of course, UB receipt is not completely a
self-selection. However, if we consider what jobs they had chosen previously or when and
what jobs they change to, ineligibility for UB itself seems to be endogenous. Moreover, the
method of Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997, 1998) does not necessarily require complete
endogenous self-selection about whether they select to join the programme or not. It only
requires that the distribution of variances should overlap among programme participants
and non-participants. Therefore, it does not seem to be irrelevant to use such a method to
evaluate the UB, although it is somewhat an extreme viewpoint.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section explains the data in detail. Section
3, then, describes the model to be estimated, and the results are shown in Section 4. In
Section 5, the results of the small data set are shown for a deeper evaluation. Finally, the
results are summarized and suggestions for further research are mentioned.
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2 Data
The following analysis uses micro-data from the Survey of Job Changers (Tenshokusha
Sougou Jittai Chosa (in Japanese) conducted in 1998 by the Ministry of Labour. This
survey contains detailed information, including characteristics of individuals, the conditions
of previous and current jobs, unemployment benefits, and the unemployment duration of
10,000 regular workers. The surveyed workers had the following three characteristics:
• They were hired in the past 12 months.
• They had worked in another firm in the past 12 months before they were hired in the
current firm.
• They are regular workers.
The feature of this survey is that the conditions (including wages, occupation, rank, indus-
try, and firm size) of both the previous job and the current job are available. Information
on whether they changed their place of residence due to job hunting is also available. Thus
any change in working conditions is easily measured. Because the main purpose of this
paper is to test the UB effect, those individuals in the sample who had not experienced
unemployment are excluded from the following analysis.
These data automatically show that the unemployed who does not obey the rule of UB
receipt. For example, many persons seem to be eligible for UB receipt by the observable
data, in terms of age, tenure, occupation, and firm size in the previous job, and the reason
for the turnover, but they do not necessarily enjoy UB. In fact, this proportion is about
50%. The reason they forfeited their eligibility cannot be seen directly because we have
no information on their eligibility. However, we can judge that the unemployed decide
endogenously whether or not to apply their eligibility. Of course, many people are ineli-
gible because of their previous jobs. In this sense, their eligibility was determined when
they got their previous job, and therefore, it seems to be predetermined for their current
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unemployment. But if their characteristics, such as age, education level, skills etc., heavily
affect the conditions of the previous job, the UB eligibility determined by the previous job
also seems to be endogenous. Thus, it is obvious that whether or not they are receiving UB
reflects, at least partly, the decision of the unemployed, and thus we should acknowledge
this endogeneity and take it into account.
The sample size, which includes those who had less than one month unemployed period,
is 7370. The summary statistics are shown in Table 1. The index of changes in conditions
between the previous and current job is defined as follows. Concerning rank and firm size,
it is set as 3 if the new job has better conditions, 2 if there is no change in conditions and
1 if otherwise. Better conditions mean larger firm scale and higher ranking. Concerning
occupation and industry, since there is no clear definition of good or bad occupations
(industries), the index is defined to be 1 if the unemployed change occupation (industry)
and 0 otherwise. This is because experiences in the previous job is more useful in the same
occupation (industry) than in another. Concerning residence, the index is defined to be 1
if they experience a changes in residence due to searching for a new job, and 0 otherwise.
Needless to say, changing residence implies a bad condition. Note that ”better condi-
tions” refers to a defined lower value in spite of a larger value in wages, firm size and
rank.
3 The Testing Hypothesis
The testable hypothesis is simply whether the UB reduces intensity of job search. The
main problem with testing this is that intensity of search cannot directly be observed. If
intensity of search could be observed, there would be no room for moral hazard. Thus, it
has to be investigated indirectly in the following manner.
As the UB reduces the budget constraints of the recipients and reduces the disutility
from the extended duration of unemployment, the duration of unemployment by recipients
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should increase unambiguously. If there is no moral hazard, the recipients seek a job with
better conditions. Conversely, because non-recipients cannot enjoy sucu a benefit, they
may accept a job with worse conditions so as to shorten the duration of unemployment.
Therefore, the recipients should be able to get better jobs than the non-recipients.
If there is moral hazard, then, as the recipients decrease their intensity of search, the
difference between the new job conditions for recipients and non-recipients decreases in
comparison with the no moral hazard case. In the extreme case, if there is no difference
between the new job conditions for recipients and non-recipients, the intensity of search
would have been greatly reduced to cancel out any effect of extended unemployment du-
ration. In the worst case, if the conditions in the new job for recipients are worse than for
non-recipients, there is strong evidence of moral hazard.
Therefore, controlling for the endogeneity of UB receipt and unemployment duration,
moral hazard is defined as the change in conditions between a previous and current job
which characterises the outcome of search behaviour, .
4 The Empirical Model
In the case of the endogeneity of UB recipients, the effect of the UB on the effort of job
search and/or for better conditions of new jobs could be recognized as a measure for the
programming evaluation. The gold standard for programme evaluation is the randomized
experiment, used in fields such as medicine and natural science in which other conditions
can be controled properly. However, in the field of economics, because such randomized
experiments need considerable time and money, and have serious ethical problems, it is
very difficult to utilize them.
If we cannot perform a randomized experiment, the programme evaluation needs to be by
the analysis of observational data where programme participation is selected endogenously.
In this case, the propensity score method (Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)) was used in the
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analysis. This method has now been improved greatly as the Nonparametric Propensity
Score Matching Method (see Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997, 1998)) and has been
applied to several fields, including medical science. For example, Heckman, Ichimura and
Todd (1997) and Dehejia and Waha (1999) applied it to a job-training programme, Ginther
(2000) applied it to education, Jalan and Ravallion (2000) and Todd, Behrman and Cheng
(2000) applied it to aid programmes of international institutions, and Fro¨lich (2000) applied
it to a rehabilitation programme.
The idea of the propensity score method is very simple: Comparison between the most
similar programme participant and non-participant in terms of characteristics other than
programme participation behavior. However, other characteristics have many dimensions
and thus simple comparison cannot, in general, be performed. The propensity score method
solves this problem by using the estimated probability of the programme participation to
define the narrowness among participants and non-participants. The method of Rosen-
baum and Rubin (1983) compares them by strata, but the Nonparametric Propensity
Score Matching Method matches them by using the kernel function nonparametrically.
Let the subscript i denote for programme participants and j for non-participants, and
define the characteristic of these two groups as Xi and Xj, the outcome of the programme
as Yi and Yj, and the estimated probability of the first step estimation for programme
participation as P (Xi) and P (Xj), respectively. In this case, the programme evaluation is
summarized by the following statistics
P
i{Yi −
P
j
YjK[(P (Xi)−P (Xj))/h]P
j
K[(P (Xi)−P (Xj))/h]
}
N
. (1)
where K[·] is a kernel function such as the Biweight kernel, which is widely used (Silverman
(1992),Todd, Behrman and Cheng (2000)); and h is bandwidth and its optimal value is
h = 0.9σP (Xj)N−0.2, where σP (Xj) is the standard deviation of P (Xj). This method is called
Kernel Matching.
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Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997) suggest the local linear matching rather than Kernel
Matching because of its efficiency. local linear matching method evaluates the programme
according to the following statistics.
P
i{Yi −
P
j
Yj{Kij
P
k
Kik(P (Xi)−P (Xk))2−Kij(P (Xi)−P (Xj))
P
k
Kik(P (Xi)−P (Xj))}P
j
Kij
P
k
Kik(P (Xi)−P (Xk))2−(
P
k
Kik(P (Xi)−P (Xk))2
}
N
(2)
where Kij = K[(P (Xi) − P (Xj))/h]. The subscript k means the summation among the
programme participants only. Both methods evaluate the programme according to the
average treatment effect5).
It is obvious that these statistics do not specify their distributions, and therefore, re-
strictive assumptions should be avoided. Thus, its confidence interval is calculated by
bootstrapping procedures, as outlined by Todd, Behrman and Cheng (2000), in which the
bias is corrected (Efron and Tibshirani (1998)). The number of replications is 1000.
The first step is the probit estimation for UB receipt. The dependent variable ri is 1 if
the ith unemployed person enjoys UB and 0 otherwise. The estimation equation is
r∗i = α0 + Ziα+Wiβ + εi
ri =
(
1 if r∗i > 0
0 otherwise
(3)
where Zi is the vector of the information about the ith unemployed and their previous jobs,
and Wi includes the duration of the on-the-job search and the dummy for whether they
voluntarily quit or not.
In particular, Zi includes: gender, the cubic function of age and tenure, education level,
occupation, position, industry, scale of firm, a dummy for any licenses, a dummy for regular
workers, and regional dummies. Needless to say, tenure, occupation, position, industry, a
dummy for regular workers, and scale of firm apply to the previous job.
Tenure, a dummy for regular workers, industry, and firm scale determine UB eligibil-
ity. Other variables in Zi affect UB receipt through the conditions of the previous job.
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Moreover, in the case of voluntary quitting, eligibility is prolonged for three months. The
duration of the on-the-job search implies heterogeneity in the preparation for job search
before unemployment.
Needless to say, the goodness of fit in this first step is the most important for the propen-
sity score method. Hence, a more extended specification, which includes the interaction
terms of gender, age, on-the-job search, and the voluntary quitting dummy, is estimated
in the first step to check its robustness.
5 Empirical Results
The empirical results for UB receipt are shown in Table 2.
It means that the unemployed who is older, less tenured (but its effect decreasing), vo-
cational school or two years college graduates compared with junior high school graduates,
and has longer OTJ search is likely enjoy UB recipients.
Moreover, the unemployed who worked as regular worker, and whose previous job was
manager, officials, or clerical comparison with profesional or technical worker in occupa-
tion, specialist or routine worker comparison with executive in position also have higher
probability of being UB recipient.
Conversely, the unemployed whose previous occupation was other worker compared with
profesional or technical worker, who quit voluntary5), and who was employed at small firm
which employees less than 30, tend to have lower probability of being UB recipient.
Note the effects the duration of the on-the-job search and the voluntary quitting dummy.
These marginal effects means that the probability of UB receipt increase by 0.6% point
due to every one month longer in OTC job search, and voluntary quitter are suffered 4.2%
lower probability.
On the other hand, regular workers in previous jobs, significantly enjoy the 20% point
higher receipt of UB, which reflects institutional background.
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Next, the empirical results for average treatment effects are summarized in Table 3,
which includes four panels—whether simple, included the interaction terms in the first step,
whether kernel matching or local linear matching were involved. Note that a positive
average treatment effect means that receipt of UB helps individuals enjoy better jobs with
respect to wages, firm scale, and ranks. Conversely, a negative average treatment effect
means that receipt of UB helps individuals enjoy better jobs with respect to occupation,
industry, and residence.
Four panels in the table share common results. Namely, UB with worse job conditions
with respect to wage and firm scale and, conversely, UB with better conditions with respect
to rank, residence and industries. However, industries is not significant in Kernel Matching.
Not all panels about occupation show significant effects. The effects are not significant in
kernel matching, but in local linear matching UB helps recipients get better jobs.
Results for wages and residence are the same, but there are some inconsistencies with
Ohkusa (2000a, b). For firm scale, although it is not significant in Ohkusa (2000b), the
results in this paper mean that UB lead to worse conditions, as in Ohkusa (2000a). For
occupation, although Ohkusa (2000a) finds UB worsened and Ohkusa (2000b) finds UB
helped to get better jobs, our results are not significant. Conversely for industry, although
Ohkusa (2000b) finds UB led to worse job conditions, our results imply that UB helps to
get a better job, as indicated by Ohkusa (2000a). Finally, for occupation, Ohkusa (2000b)
finds that UB worsens job conditions but our results are not significant.
6 Empirical Results for the Split Samples
Tables 4 to 11 show the empirical results of the sample data split according to their char-
acteristics: namely, Table 4 contains the results for those who experienced unemployment
for more than one or three month(s); Table 5 for those whose age is more or less than
45; Table 6 for those who were employed in firms in the previous job with more or fewer
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than 100 employees; and Table 7 for those who were regular or not regular workers in their
previous jobs. The values, of 45 years old and 100 employees, are chosen so as to split the
sample almost by half.
Splitting the sample by unemployment duration is for the sake of excluding miss- report-
ing and to clarify the differences between eligibility and receipt of UB. Whether or not the
unemployed were regular workers in their previous jobs may also heavily affect eligibility
for UB. The split by age can demonstrate the effect of age discrimination in the hiring of
workers in Japan, which has become an important social issue. The split by previous firm
size also can capture mobility of workers in changing jobs according to firm size.
All tables share the same features and are consistent with Table 3. In particular, the
wage reduction due to UB receipt is very clear, and UB encourages good jobs in the sense
of rank or residence except for irregular workers in previous jobs. On the other hand,
there are some counter-intuitive results. For example, in Tables 4, the differences between
UB recipients and non-recipients are larger in the sample of those whose unemployment
duration is more than one month than those in the sample whose unemployment duration
is more than three months, namely -.11 vs -.10 in Kernel matching or-.12 vs -.11 in local
linear matching. Thus, it seems that longer unemployment duration reduces wages in new
jobs as much as UB receipt does, athough such a difference is not significant.
Concerning occupation, most estimates are not significant except in Table 5 and the
Local Linear Matching case in Table 4. On the other hand, UB encourages staying in the
same industry, regardless of the unemployment duration, for those who were older than
45 and employed in previous jobs in firms with less than 100 employees, but these are
insignificant in other cases. Moreover, UB encourages individuals to move to smaller firms
for the same group of the unemployed (and regular worker in previous jobs).
In summary, the effect of UB on wages, rank and residence are confirmed to be robust,
even if the sample is split. The most interesting case is irregular workers in previous jobs,
indicated in Table 7. They do not suffer from UB receipts, except for wages. Since regular
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workers share the all tendencies in Table 3, inertia in residence due to UB is specified only
for regular workers.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper examines how the UB affects intensity or search efforts of the unemployed,
measured by the working conditions of new jobs, being the outcome of search behaviour,
taking into account of the endogeneity of UB receipts by using a Nonparametric Propensity
Score Matching Method.
Empirical results show that the UB recipients significantly change to worse job condi-
tions in terms of wages and firm size, but change to better job conditions with respect
to occupation, position, industry, and residence. While the effect for occupation is not
significant, UB recipients have a significant tendency not to change. In other words, the
results of other conditions imply that they reduce the reservation wage so as to get better
conditions with respect to occupation, industry, and residence. This implies that there is
strong inertia in these aspects.
This paper focuses on programme evaluation for UB at the individual level. Needless
to say, individual should maximize their utility under their given condition. However,
if our interest extended to the social efficiency, individual maximizing behavior does not
necessariy yields social efficiency. In the case of UB system, such inertia would imply social
inefficiency in the sense of misallocation or discourage the movement in labor.
Policy implication from this research is obvious. Since UB discourage labor movement
in the sense of industry or region, the system of UB should be reform to penalize such a
inertia or encourage to move. To do so, UB should pay additionally if the unemployed
decide to move, or the unemployed ought to apply to at least one firm within a week
like in the U.S.A. These reform should rise intensity of job search, shorten the duration
of unemployment, and then the total payment might be reduced. It means to rise social
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efficiency by reducing individual moral hazard, even though moral hazard is not analyzed
in the main text.
Finally, we make some remarks about further research. First of all, the sample in this
paper excludes those who are non-regular workers and not currently in the labour force.
Because outflows to non-regular workers in the labour market and outflows to the outside
labour market are very important aspects of the unemployment situation and the func-
tioning of the UB, it is necessary to consider this effect in evaluation of the UB scheme.
Secondly, further research should control for the omitted variables in this analysis, such as
household assets, income from other members of the household, and household structure,
which are not available in this data set.
Moreover, to evaluate more directly the inertia in required wages, occupation, etc., a
panel analysis of the effects of these variables on unemployment duration would be very
important.
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Footnotes
*) The author has permission to use and analyze the micro data of the Survey of Job
Changers (Tenshokusha Sougou Jittai Chosa. This paper was presented at the Labour
Study Group Meeting in 2000. I thank the participants of this meeting, especially
Prof. Inoki at Osaka University, Prof. Tachibanaki at Kyoto University, Prof. Mura-
matsu at Nanzan University and Prof. Ohta at Nagoya University for their support
and useful discussion. Finally, I thank Ms. Kazuko Matsumoto for her helpful sup-
port of my research. Needless to say, any remaining errors are mine.
1) In Japan, unemployment insurance, called the Employment Insurance System, in-
cludes not only unemployment benefits but also subsidies for temporarily declining
industries, training costs for certain occupations, payment for childcare leave, etc.
2) Yashiro and Futagami (1998) discusses aspects of the Employment Insurance System
other than UB.
3) Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) is a good survey of this field.
4) Recently, Kohara (2000) has analyzed this issue by using micro data.
5) The word ”treatment effect” is very common in applied econometric analysis as ap-
peared in Greene(2000) and it means how endogenous choice (such as education
attainment) affect outcome (such as wage or income). Nonparametric Propensity
Score Matching Method, which is adopted in this research, is the one of the latest
method to evaluate treatment effect. The word of average in ”average treatment ef-
fect” implies that the estimated treatment effect by Nonparametric Propensity Score
Matching Method does not depend on individual conditions, but depend on the av-
erage of overall distribution of individuals.
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6) In Japan, unlike in the USA, voluntary quitter also can receive UB with some penalty.
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Table : Summary Statistics
All Sample Over One Month Sample
Mean Stand.
Dev.
Mean Stand.
Dev.
Duration of Unemployment(in Month) 3.221627 3.554212 4.832398 3.623592
Duration of Job Search(in Month) 5.922759 6.392643 7.901101 6.831902
Female Dummy .3887458 .4874984 .4070796 .491343
Age 33.20393 10.36404 33.44356 10.56373
Tenure (previous)(in Year) 4.362305 3.909859 4.606842 4.010689
Duration of OTJ Search(in Month) 2.700868 4.44971 3.067588 4.826769
High School Graduate .4794576 .4996117 .49169 .4999849
Vocational School Graduate .1355932 .3423793 .1372761 .3441757
Two Year College Graduate .0997966 .2997489 .1014461 .3019512
University Graduate .2244068 .4172193 .2089359 .4065924
Number of Turnover 2.407493 1.641039 2.388637 1.607825
Occupation (Previous)
Managers and Officials .0310508 .1734669 .030218 .1712051
Clerical and Related Workers .2417627 .4281803 .2540471 .4353712
Sales Workers .1137627 .3175444 .1165551 .3209241
Service Workers .0978983 .2971972 .0949709 .2932063
Protective Service Workers .0143729 .1190303 .0159724 .125382
Workers in Transport
and Communications Occupations .0527458 .2235407 .0509389 .2198967
Craftsmen, Mining, Production Process
and Construction Workers .3049492 .4604171 .3121088 .463404
Others Workers .0035254 .0592745 .0034535 .0586711
Occupation (Current)
Managers and Officials .0387797 .1930825 .0438161 .2047078
Clerical and Related Workers .2306441 .4212736 .2430391 .4289648
Sales Workers .1427797 .3498717 .146989 .3541332
Service Workers .1172881 .3217851 .1137492 .3175407
Protective Service Workers .0115254 .1067433 .0107921 .1033343
Workers in Transport
and Communications Occupations .0610169 .2393776 .056335 .2305924
Craftsmen, Mining, Production Process
and Construction Workers .2526102 .4345387 .2559896 .4364631
Others Workers .0069153 .0828756 .0064753 .0802169
(Table 1: continue)
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(Table 1: continue)
Position (Previous)
Heads of Departments .0158666 .1249677 .0153282 .1228676
Heads of Sections .0322756 .176743 .0284974 .166407
Subsection Chiefs .0197993 .1393195 .0170553 .1294913
Managers .0343097 .1820359 .0328152 .1781719
Specialists .1212368 .3264244 .1068653 .3089753
Routine Workers .7732574 .4187531 .7979275 .4015894
Position (Current)
Heads of Departments .018315 .134097 .0198661 .1395552
Heads of Sections .043549 .2041033 .0483697 .2145693
Subsection Chiefs .0356804 .1855046 .0347657 .1832056
Managers .0610501 .2394384 .0639171 .2446316
Specialists .1226428 .328049 .1086158 .3111902
Routine Workers .7073667 .4550023 .7123731 .4527051
Regular Worker (Previous) .8253559 .3796881 .8443773 .3625364
Industries(Previous)
Mining .0051546 .0716154 .0060462 .0775303
Construction .0866793 .2813837 .0839991 .2774165
Manufacturing .289745 .4536747 .2902181 .4539119
Gas and Electric Power .0204829 .1416548 .0209458 .1432184
Trans. and Comm. .0680955 .2519268 .0673721 .2506923
Wholesale and Retail .1517906 .3588421 .1591449 .3658507
Bank and Insurance .0411015 .1985384 .0442669 .2057097
Real Estate .0113945 .1061422 .0127402 .1121634
Service industry .2858112 .4518305 .2785575 .4483376
Government .0321487 .1764068 .0295832 .1694529
Industries(Current)
Construction .0367458 .1881497 .0351824 .1842605
Manufacturing .4005424 .4900416 .4077272 .491465
Gas and Electric Power .015322 .1228386 .015109 .1219997
Trans. and Comm. .0401356 .1962905 .0375567 .1901419
Wholesale and Retail .1895593 .3919789 .1936111 .3951702
Bank and Insurance .0143729 .1190303 .0159724 .125382
Real Estate .0157288 .1244328 .0170516 .1294776
Service Industry .2672542 .4425562 .2570689 .4370649
Firm Size (Previous)
500999 .0629153 .2428269 .0638895 .2445824
300499 .067661 .2511803 .0671271 .2502691
100299 .1783051 .3827953 .1877833 .3905812
3099 .2324068 .4223956 .2346212 .4238076
529 .2485424 .4321972 .2443341 .4297381
4 .0458305 .2091315 .0403626 .1968295
(Table 1: continue)
19
(Table 1: continue)
Firm Size (Current) 189.4168 566.1266 165.8642 455.567
Dummy for UB Recipient .2723081 .4451778 .412133 .492272
Dummy of UB Receive 24.33789 52.22899 38.61213 61.67502
Dummy for Voluntary Quitters .8375593 .3688796 .8031513 .3976599
Expiration month in UB .0576271 .2330528 .087848 .2831043
Dummy for License Holder .3955254 .4889964 .3850637 .4866629
Rate of Change in Wage -.0213966 .1689799 -.040880 .1690209
Dummy for Change in Occupation .3758644 .4843781 .3865746 .4870173
Dummy for Change in Industry .5659661 .495663 .5786747 .4938248
Change in Firm Size 1.879458 .8525586 1.848478 .8513973
Change in Position 2.075034 .4682201 2.099136 .4702184
Change in Residence .1909153 .3930491 .1720268 .3774444
Note: The sample size was 7370 in the full sample and 4623 in the restricted sample. This
table omits junior high school graduates from the education background, professional and
technical workers in Occupation, executives in position, agriculture in industry (previous),
mining in industry (current) in the industry and those firms with over 1000 employees in
firm size. Change in firm size is 3 if firm size in the current job is larger than in the previous
job, 2 if firm size in the current job is the same as in the previous job, and 0 otherwise.
Change in position is 3 if position in the current job is higher than in the previous job, 2
if position in the current job is the same as in the previous job, and 0 otherwise.
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Table 2: Empirical Results for UB Recipients
Estimated
Coef.
z value p-value Marginal Effect
Female Dummy .1033511 1.480 0.139 .02468295
Age .0427905 1.966 0.050 .01021948
Age2 -.0004198 -1.307 0.191 -.00010026
Tenure .1398075 3.977 0.000 .03338969
Tenure2 -.009176 -3.465 0.001 -.00219146
Age·Tenure .0009248 0.906 0.365 .00022086
High School Graduate .1404616 1.135 0.257 .0335459
Vocational School Graduate .3932996 2.731 0.006 .09393022
Two Year College Graduate .2765836 1.839 0.066 .06605539
University Graduate .1480349 1.020 0.308 .03535459
Duration of OTJ Search (in Month) .0234708 3.833 0.000 .00560545
Occupation (Previous)
Managers and Officials .4799452 2.572 0.010 .11462344
Clerical and Related Workers .4655627 4.270 0.000 .11118852
Sales Workers .0811426 0.679 0.498 .01937898
Service Workers .1331698 1.060 0.290 .03180442
Protective Service Workers .0656015 0.260 0.795 .01566736
Workers in Transport
and Communications Occupations .0936347 0.578 0.563 .02236242
Craftsmen, Mining, Production Process
and Construction Workers .0627703 0.548 0.584 .01499118
Others Workers -.6649962 -2.287 0.022 -.15881847
Position (Previous)
Heads of Departments .376913 0.915 0.361 .09001669
Heads of Sections .2271761 0.600 0.548 .05425559
Subsection Chiefs .5413576 1.294 0.196 .12929033
Managers .5561739 1.442 0.150 .13282886
Specialists .8646002 2.323 0.020 .2064891
Routine Workers .6969472 1.920 0.055 .16644919
Regular Worker (Previous) .8509191 8.483 0.000 .20322171
Industries(Previous)
Mining .8499619 2.195 0.028 .20299311
Construction -.2630254 -0.932 0.352 -.06281734
Manufacturing -.106026 -0.400 0.689 -.02532178
Gas and Electric Power -.1158004 -0.362 0.717 -.02765616
(Table 2: continue)
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(Table 2:continue)
Trans. and Comm. -.2310791 -0.824 0.410 -.05518773
Wholesale and Retail -.0962391 -0.355 0.723 -.0229844
Bank and Insurance .0090034 0.031 0.975 .00215024
Real Estate -.0275391 -0.072 0.943 -.00657706
Service Industry -.1683352 -0.632 0.528 -.04020285
Government -.8580665 -2.519 0.012 -.20492871
Firm Size (Previous)
500999 -.0623052 -0.495 0.621 -.0148801
300499 .1160791 0.904 0.366 .02772272
100299 .0899564 0.835 0.404 .02148393
3099 -.0611228 -0.569 0.569 -.01459772
529 -.1851506 -1.707 0.088 -.0442188
4 -1.05897 -5.656 0.000 -.25290981
Dummy for Voluntary Quitters -1.859075 -22.030 0.000 -.04217394
Dummy for License Holder .0256568 0.418 0.676 -.44399574
constant -2.025143 -3.448 0.001
Note: Sample size is 7310. This table shows empirical results for UB recipients by using
probit estimation. Prefecture dummies are also included as explanatory variables. The
null hypothesis that all coefficients are 0 is rejected at the 10% significance level.
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Table 3: Average Treatment Effect and Its Confidence Interval by
Bootstrapping
Average
Treatment
Effect
90%CI lower 90%CI upper
No Interaction
Kernel Matching
Wage -.1207386 -.1351641 -1063906
Occupation .0118148 -.0076405 0279211
Rank .0905997 .074681 1068482
Industry -.0146201 -.0338939 0036617
Firm Scale -.0199196 -.0353807 -0024914
Residence -.0670513 -.080422 -0541712
With Interaction
Kernel Matching
Wage -.1183801 -.1330591 -.1033543
Occupation .0116793 -.005846 .0286982
Rank .0597894 .0449035 .0744988
Industry -.0145074 -.0327647 .0033123
Firm Scale -.043931 -.0589261 -.024844
Residence -.0558737 -.068305 -.0429952
No Interaction
Local Linear Matching
Wage -.1271544 -.1428883 -.111003
Occupation -.0041727 -.0226321 .0134351
Rank .086987 .0719774 .1031
Industry -.0259407 -.0447944 -.0059745
Firm Scale -.0303182 -.0473537 -.0146783
Residence -.0722286 -.083559 -.0584522
(to be continued)
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With Interaction
Local Linear Matching
Wage -.1203179 -.1350401 -.1057044
Occupation -.0032718 -.0192442 .0150087
Rank .0777409 .0618881 .0930488
Industry -.0361646 -.0560212 -.0179846
Firm Scale -.0701612 -.0874401 -.0545452
Residence -.0412021 -.0551658 -.0291145
Note: By definition, a positive average treatment effect means UB helps recipients with
achieving better jobs in terms of wages, firm scale and rank, and conversely a negative
average treatment effect means UB helps recipients with achieving better jobs in terms of
occupations, industry and residence.
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Table 4 Estimation Result in the Splitted Sample by
Unemployment Duration
Estimator Lower Bound for
90% CI
Upper Bound for
90% CI
More than One Month Unemployment Sample
Kernel Matching
Wage -.1115027 -.1269561 -.0946632
Occupation -.0204067 -.0368657 .000601
Rank .1047996 .0885575 .1199356
Industry -.0529049 -.0713551 -.0329963
Firm Scale -.0491676 -.0669497 -.032832
Residence -.0496566 -.0616096 -.0366904
Local Linear Matching
Wage -.1248564 -.1416191 -.1104166
Occupation -.0686503 -.0890456 -.0477804
Rank .0684267 .0524902 .087909
Industry -.1600161 -.1890808 -.1338078
Firm Scale -.0375092 -.0542346 -.0201803
Residence -.0261743 -.0398498 -.0117546
More than Three Month Unemployment Sample
Kernel Matching
Wage -.1028942 -.1191996 -.0845015
Occupation -.0288884 -.0498468 -.0093902
Rank .1226006 .1043407 .1386159
Industry -.0677806 -.0892333 -.0473856
Firm Scale -.052914 -.0719727 -.0335174
Residence -.0420476 -.0561187 -.0245391
Local Linear Matching
Wage -.1071367 -.1236404 -.0897795
Occupation -.0297708 -.0488186 -.0103706
Rank .1228667 .1045702 .1405451
Industry -.067302 -.0880723 -.0472635
Firm Scale -.0538154 -.0701077 -.033735
Residence -.0409192 -.0553418 -.0270301
Note: In More than One Month Unemployment Sample, sample size is 4627 and the
percentage of UB recipients is 41%.In More than Three Month Unemployment Sample
, sample size is 3263 and the percentage of UB recipients is 51%.
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Table 5 Estimation Result in the Splitted Sample by Age
Estimator Lower Bound for
90% CI
Upper Bound for
90% CI
More than 45 Years Sample
Kernel Matching
Wage -.1944965 -.2173423 -.1701821
Occupation -.0085647 -.0414773 .0239505
Rank .1562482 .1224806 .185368
Industry -.0336564 -.0697993 -.0009314
Firm Scale -.1232025 -.1527872 -.091062
Residence -.0503855 -.0692953 -.0266118
Local Linear Matching
Wage -.1979113 -.2211324 -.1741766
Occupation -.0115803 -.040787 .0230907
Rank .1541782 .1231887 .1872306
Industry -.035558 -.0696653 -.0031441
Firm Scale -.1230316 -.1525212 -.0938073
Residence -.0495422 -.0703003 -.02793
Less than 45 Years Sample
Kernel Matching
Wage -.091088 -.10885 -.0706583
Occupation .0169211 -.0066959 .0366123
Rank .051688 .0358279 .0705987
Industry .0044001 -.0172234 .0274197
Firm Scale -.0026244 -.0227705 .0157952
Residence -.0679417 -.0831107 -.0517283
Local Linear Matching
Wage -.0901019 -.1102385 -.0704417
Occupation .0179212 -.0018857 .0394696
Rank .0504438 .0335157 .0665741
Industry .0046965 -.01733 .0268647
Firm Scale -.001986 -.0223087 .0171606
Residence -.068315 -.0836235 -.0516054
Note: In More than 45 Years Sample, sample size is 1334 and the percentage of UB
recipients is 44%. In Less than 45 Years Sample, sample size is 6012 and the percentage of
UB recipients is 23%.
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Table 6 Estimation Result in the Splitted Sample by Firm Size in
Previous Job Sample
Estimator Lower Bound for
90% CI
Upper Bound for
90% CI
More than 100 Employees in Previous Job Sample
Kernel Matching
Wage -.1363235 -.1564063 -.1153728
Occupation .0178089 -.0087679 .0434965
Rank .0861658 .0652924 .1087946
Industry -.0117147 -.0381918 .0143584
Firm Scale -.0001705 -.0137233 .0144713
Residence -.0620181 -.0816955 -.0412086
Local Linear Matching
Wage -.13684 -.1564934 -.1177347
Occupation .016531 -.0101049 .0418499
Rank .0839548 .0638462 .1077595
Industry -.0075672 -.0325977 .0194717
Firm Scale -.0009982 -.013461 .0132123
Residence -.0645327 -.0846222 -.0452113
Less than 100 Employees in Previous Job Sample
Kernel Matching
Wage -.1144999 -.1350622 -.0898757
Occupation -.0035074 -.0279101 .0228596
Rank .0981287 .0780418 .120901
Industry -.0297036 -.0559166 -.005473
Firm Scale -.0327644 -.0596712 -.0073055
Residence -.0711465 -.0858628 -.0538036
Local Linear Matching
Wage -.1122654 -.1347402 -.0906852
Occupation -.0059592 -.0291131 .0189247
Rank .0969692 .0751396 .1180688
Industry -.0299694 -.0566145 -.0033964
Firm Scale -.0323813 -.0573174 -.004843
Residence -.0697749 -.0855837 -.0546411
Note: In More than 100 Employees in Previous Job Sample ,sample size is 3485 and the
percentage of UB recipients is 28%. In Less than 100 Employees in Previous Job Sample,
sample size is 3862 and the percentage of UB recipients is 25%.
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Table 7 Estimation Result in the Splitted Sample by Job Status
in Previous Job
Estimator Lower Bound for
90% CI
Upper Bound for
90% CI
Regular Worker in Previous Job Sample
Kernel Matching
Wage -.1219047 -.1375898 -.106063
Occupation .0074471 -.0116001 .0263402
Rank .1016683 .0837323 .1163091
Industry -.0163823 -.0355157 .0021391
Firm Scale -.0533206 -.0704582 -.0347349
Residence -.0735032 -.0878678 -.0598672
Local Linear Matching
Wage -.1212025 -.1368945 -.1053958
Occupation .0085217 -.0107216 .0272051
Rank .1023505 .0844658 .1170635
Industry -.0176213 -.0363111 .0009061
Firm Scale -.0522616 -.0692059 -.0335318
Residence -.072044 -.0863941 -.0584397
Irregular Worker in Previous Job Sample
Kernel Matching
Wage -.1069177 -.1648101 -.0512639
Occupation -.0066984 -.0609486 .0473442
Rank .0025267 -.0299082 .0348285
Industry -.0295545 -.0842828 .0297468
Firm Scale .019457 -.0295889 .0651243
Residence -.0225304 -.0533212 .0116156
Local Linear Matching
Wage -.103123 -.1559213 -.0437966
Occupation -.0104438 -.0656403 .0462753
Rank .0039437 -.0275749 .0376985
Industry -.0285056 -.0816535 .0263088
Firm Scale .020011 -.026652 .0693924
Residence -.0195379 -.0527682 .0153035
Note: In Regular Worker in Previous Job Sample, sample size is 6064 and the percentage
of UB recipients is 29%. In Irregular Worker in Previous Job Sample, sample size is 1283
and the percentage of UB recipients is 17%.
28
